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kernel/linux-imx6_3.14.28/samples/seccomp/bpf-fancy.c 2.42 KB
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  /*
   * Seccomp BPF example using a macro-based generator.
   *
   * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors <chromium-os-dev@chromium.org>
   * Author: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
   *
   * The code may be used by anyone for any purpose,
   * and can serve as a starting point for developing
   * applications using prctl(PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER).
   */
  
  #include <linux/filter.h>
  #include <linux/seccomp.h>
  #include <linux/unistd.h>
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <string.h>
  #include <sys/prctl.h>
  #include <unistd.h>
  
  #include "bpf-helper.h"
  
  #ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
  #define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
  #endif
  
  int main(int argc, char **argv)
  {
  	struct bpf_labels l;
  	static const char msg1[] = "Please type something: ";
  	static const char msg2[] = "You typed: ";
  	char buf[256];
  	struct sock_filter filter[] = {
  		/* TODO: LOAD_SYSCALL_NR(arch) and enforce an arch */
  		LOAD_SYSCALL_NR,
  		SYSCALL(__NR_exit, ALLOW),
  		SYSCALL(__NR_exit_group, ALLOW),
  		SYSCALL(__NR_write, JUMP(&l, write_fd)),
  		SYSCALL(__NR_read, JUMP(&l, read)),
  		DENY,  /* Don't passthrough into a label */
  
  		LABEL(&l, read),
  		ARG(0),
  		JNE(STDIN_FILENO, DENY),
  		ARG(1),
  		JNE((unsigned long)buf, DENY),
  		ARG(2),
  		JGE(sizeof(buf), DENY),
  		ALLOW,
  
  		LABEL(&l, write_fd),
  		ARG(0),
  		JEQ(STDOUT_FILENO, JUMP(&l, write_buf)),
  		JEQ(STDERR_FILENO, JUMP(&l, write_buf)),
  		DENY,
  
  		LABEL(&l, write_buf),
  		ARG(1),
  		JEQ((unsigned long)msg1, JUMP(&l, msg1_len)),
  		JEQ((unsigned long)msg2, JUMP(&l, msg2_len)),
  		JEQ((unsigned long)buf, JUMP(&l, buf_len)),
  		DENY,
  
  		LABEL(&l, msg1_len),
  		ARG(2),
  		JLT(sizeof(msg1), ALLOW),
  		DENY,
  
  		LABEL(&l, msg2_len),
  		ARG(2),
  		JLT(sizeof(msg2), ALLOW),
  		DENY,
  
  		LABEL(&l, buf_len),
  		ARG(2),
  		JLT(sizeof(buf), ALLOW),
  		DENY,
  	};
  	struct sock_fprog prog = {
  		.filter = filter,
  		.len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])),
  	};
  	ssize_t bytes;
  	bpf_resolve_jumps(&l, filter, sizeof(filter)/sizeof(*filter));
  
  	if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
  		perror("prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS)");
  		return 1;
  	}
  
  	if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog)) {
  		perror("prctl(SECCOMP)");
  		return 1;
  	}
  	syscall(__NR_write, STDOUT_FILENO, msg1, strlen(msg1));
  	bytes = syscall(__NR_read, STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf)-1);
  	bytes = (bytes > 0 ? bytes : 0);
  	syscall(__NR_write, STDERR_FILENO, msg2, strlen(msg2));
  	syscall(__NR_write, STDERR_FILENO, buf, bytes);
  	/* Now get killed */
  	syscall(__NR_write, STDERR_FILENO, msg2, strlen(msg2)+2);
  	return 0;
  }