============================
  			 KERNEL KEY RETENTION SERVICE
  			 ============================
  
  This service allows cryptographic keys, authentication tokens, cross-domain
  user mappings, and similar to be cached in the kernel for the use of
  filesystems and other kernel services.
  
  Keyrings are permitted; these are a special type of key that can hold links to
  other keys. Processes each have three standard keyring subscriptions that a
  kernel service can search for relevant keys.
  
  The key service can be configured on by enabling:
  
  	"Security options"/"Enable access key retention support" (CONFIG_KEYS)
  
  This document has the following sections:
  
  	- Key overview
  	- Key service overview
  	- Key access permissions
  	- SELinux support
  	- New procfs files
  	- Userspace system call interface
  	- Kernel services
  	- Notes on accessing payload contents
  	- Defining a key type
  	- Request-key callback service
  	- Garbage collection
  
  
  ============
  KEY OVERVIEW
  ============
  
  In this context, keys represent units of cryptographic data, authentication
  tokens, keyrings, etc.. These are represented in the kernel by struct key.
  
  Each key has a number of attributes:
  
  	- A serial number.
  	- A type.
  	- A description (for matching a key in a search).
  	- Access control information.
  	- An expiry time.
  	- A payload.
  	- State.
  
  
   (*) Each key is issued a serial number of type key_serial_t that is unique for
       the lifetime of that key. All serial numbers are positive non-zero 32-bit
       integers.
  
       Userspace programs can use a key's serial numbers as a way to gain access
       to it, subject to permission checking.
  
   (*) Each key is of a defined "type". Types must be registered inside the
       kernel by a kernel service (such as a filesystem) before keys of that type
       can be added or used. Userspace programs cannot define new types directly.
  
       Key types are represented in the kernel by struct key_type. This defines a
       number of operations that can be performed on a key of that type.
  
       Should a type be removed from the system, all the keys of that type will
       be invalidated.
  
   (*) Each key has a description. This should be a printable string. The key
       type provides an operation to perform a match between the description on a
       key and a criterion string.
  
   (*) Each key has an owner user ID, a group ID and a permissions mask. These
       are used to control what a process may do to a key from userspace, and
       whether a kernel service will be able to find the key.
  
   (*) Each key can be set to expire at a specific time by the key type's
       instantiation function. Keys can also be immortal.
  
   (*) Each key can have a payload. This is a quantity of data that represent the
       actual "key". In the case of a keyring, this is a list of keys to which
       the keyring links; in the case of a user-defined key, it's an arbitrary
       blob of data.
  
       Having a payload is not required; and the payload can, in fact, just be a
       value stored in the struct key itself.
  
       When a key is instantiated, the key type's instantiation function is
       called with a blob of data, and that then creates the key's payload in
       some way.
  
       Similarly, when userspace wants to read back the contents of the key, if
       permitted, another key type operation will be called to convert the key's
       attached payload back into a blob of data.
  
   (*) Each key can be in one of a number of basic states:
  
       (*) Uninstantiated. The key exists, but does not have any data attached.
       	 Keys being requested from userspace will be in this state.
  
       (*) Instantiated. This is the normal state. The key is fully formed, and
  	 has data attached.
  
       (*) Negative. This is a relatively short-lived state. The key acts as a
  	 note saying that a previous call out to userspace failed, and acts as
  	 a throttle on key lookups. A negative key can be updated to a normal
  	 state.
  
       (*) Expired. Keys can have lifetimes set. If their lifetime is exceeded,
  	 they traverse to this state. An expired key can be updated back to a
  	 normal state.
  
       (*) Revoked. A key is put in this state by userspace action. It can't be
  	 found or operated upon (apart from by unlinking it).
  
       (*) Dead. The key's type was unregistered, and so the key is now useless.
  
  Keys in the last three states are subject to garbage collection.  See the
  section on "Garbage collection".
  
  
  ====================
  KEY SERVICE OVERVIEW
  ====================
  
  The key service provides a number of features besides keys:
  
   (*) The key service defines three special key types:
  
       (+) "keyring"
  
  	 Keyrings are special keys that contain a list of other keys. Keyring
  	 lists can be modified using various system calls. Keyrings should not
  	 be given a payload when created.
  
       (+) "user"
  
  	 A key of this type has a description and a payload that are arbitrary
  	 blobs of data. These can be created, updated and read by userspace,
  	 and aren't intended for use by kernel services.
  
       (+) "logon"
  
  	 Like a "user" key, a "logon" key has a payload that is an arbitrary
  	 blob of data. It is intended as a place to store secrets which are
  	 accessible to the kernel but not to userspace programs.
  
  	 The description can be arbitrary, but must be prefixed with a non-zero
  	 length string that describes the key "subclass". The subclass is
  	 separated from the rest of the description by a ':'. "logon" keys can
  	 be created and updated from userspace, but the payload is only
  	 readable from kernel space.
  
   (*) Each process subscribes to three keyrings: a thread-specific keyring, a
       process-specific keyring, and a session-specific keyring.
  
       The thread-specific keyring is discarded from the child when any sort of
       clone, fork, vfork or execve occurs. A new keyring is created only when
       required.
  
       The process-specific keyring is replaced with an empty one in the child on
       clone, fork, vfork unless CLONE_THREAD is supplied, in which case it is
       shared. execve also discards the process's process keyring and creates a
       new one.
  
       The session-specific keyring is persistent across clone, fork, vfork and
       execve, even when the latter executes a set-UID or set-GID binary. A
       process can, however, replace its current session keyring with a new one
       by using PR_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING. It is permitted to request an anonymous
       new one, or to attempt to create or join one of a specific name.
  
       The ownership of the thread keyring changes when the real UID and GID of
       the thread changes.
  
   (*) Each user ID resident in the system holds two special keyrings: a user
       specific keyring and a default user session keyring. The default session
       keyring is initialised with a link to the user-specific keyring.
  
       When a process changes its real UID, if it used to have no session key, it
       will be subscribed to the default session key for the new UID.
  
       If a process attempts to access its session key when it doesn't have one,
       it will be subscribed to the default for its current UID.
  
   (*) Each user has two quotas against which the keys they own are tracked. One
       limits the total number of keys and keyrings, the other limits the total
       amount of description and payload space that can be consumed.
  
       The user can view information on this and other statistics through procfs
       files.  The root user may also alter the quota limits through sysctl files
       (see the section "New procfs files").
  
       Process-specific and thread-specific keyrings are not counted towards a
       user's quota.
  
       If a system call that modifies a key or keyring in some way would put the
       user over quota, the operation is refused and error EDQUOT is returned.
  
   (*) There's a system call interface by which userspace programs can create and
       manipulate keys and keyrings.
  
   (*) There's a kernel interface by which services can register types and search
       for keys.
  
   (*) There's a way for the a search done from the kernel to call back to
       userspace to request a key that can't be found in a process's keyrings.
  
   (*) An optional filesystem is available through which the key database can be
       viewed and manipulated.
  
  
  ======================
  KEY ACCESS PERMISSIONS
  ======================
  
  Keys have an owner user ID, a group access ID, and a permissions mask. The mask
  has up to eight bits each for possessor, user, group and other access. Only
  six of each set of eight bits are defined. These permissions granted are:
  
   (*) View
  
       This permits a key or keyring's attributes to be viewed - including key
       type and description.
  
   (*) Read
  
       This permits a key's payload to be viewed or a keyring's list of linked
       keys.
  
   (*) Write
  
       This permits a key's payload to be instantiated or updated, or it allows a
       link to be added to or removed from a keyring.
  
   (*) Search
  
       This permits keyrings to be searched and keys to be found. Searches can
       only recurse into nested keyrings that have search permission set.
  
   (*) Link
  
       This permits a key or keyring to be linked to. To create a link from a
       keyring to a key, a process must have Write permission on the keyring and
       Link permission on the key.
  
   (*) Set Attribute
  
       This permits a key's UID, GID and permissions mask to be changed.
  
  For changing the ownership, group ID or permissions mask, being the owner of
  the key or having the sysadmin capability is sufficient.
  
  
  ===============
  SELINUX SUPPORT
  ===============
  
  The security class "key" has been added to SELinux so that mandatory access
  controls can be applied to keys created within various contexts.  This support
  is preliminary, and is likely to change quite significantly in the near future.
  Currently, all of the basic permissions explained above are provided in SELinux
  as well; SELinux is simply invoked after all basic permission checks have been
  performed.
  
  The value of the file /proc/self/attr/keycreate influences the labeling of
  newly-created keys.  If the contents of that file correspond to an SELinux
  security context, then the key will be assigned that context.  Otherwise, the
  key will be assigned the current context of the task that invoked the key
  creation request.  Tasks must be granted explicit permission to assign a
  particular context to newly-created keys, using the "create" permission in the
  key security class.
  
  The default keyrings associated with users will be labeled with the default
  context of the user if and only if the login programs have been instrumented to
  properly initialize keycreate during the login process.  Otherwise, they will
  be labeled with the context of the login program itself.
  
  Note, however, that the default keyrings associated with the root user are
  labeled with the default kernel context, since they are created early in the
  boot process, before root has a chance to log in.
  
  The keyrings associated with new threads are each labeled with the context of
  their associated thread, and both session and process keyrings are handled
  similarly.
  
  
  ================
  NEW PROCFS FILES
  ================
  
  Two files have been added to procfs by which an administrator can find out
  about the status of the key service:
  
   (*) /proc/keys
  
       This lists the keys that are currently viewable by the task reading the
       file, giving information about their type, description and permissions.
       It is not possible to view the payload of the key this way, though some
       information about it may be given.
  
       The only keys included in the list are those that grant View permission to
       the reading process whether or not it possesses them.  Note that LSM
       security checks are still performed, and may further filter out keys that
       the current process is not authorised to view.
  
       The contents of the file look like this:
  
  	SERIAL   FLAGS  USAGE EXPY PERM     UID   GID   TYPE      DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY
  	00000001 I-----    39 perm 1f3f0000     0     0 keyring   _uid_ses.0: 1/4
  	00000002 I-----     2 perm 1f3f0000     0     0 keyring   _uid.0: empty
  	00000007 I-----     1 perm 1f3f0000     0     0 keyring   _pid.1: empty
  	0000018d I-----     1 perm 1f3f0000     0     0 keyring   _pid.412: empty
  	000004d2 I--Q--     1 perm 1f3f0000    32    -1 keyring   _uid.32: 1/4
  	000004d3 I--Q--     3 perm 1f3f0000    32    -1 keyring   _uid_ses.32: empty
  	00000892 I--QU-     1 perm 1f000000     0     0 user      metal:copper: 0
  	00000893 I--Q-N     1  35s 1f3f0000     0     0 user      metal:silver: 0
  	00000894 I--Q--     1  10h 003f0000     0     0 user      metal:gold: 0
  
       The flags are:
  
  	I	Instantiated
  	R	Revoked
  	D	Dead
  	Q	Contributes to user's quota
  	U	Under construction by callback to userspace
  	N	Negative key
  
       This file must be enabled at kernel configuration time as it allows anyone
       to list the keys database.
  
   (*) /proc/key-users
  
       This file lists the tracking data for each user that has at least one key
       on the system.  Such data includes quota information and statistics:
  
  	[root@andromeda root]# cat /proc/key-users
  	0:     46 45/45 1/100 13/10000
  	29:     2 2/2 2/100 40/10000
  	32:     2 2/2 2/100 40/10000
  	38:     2 2/2 2/100 40/10000
  
       The format of each line is
  	<UID>:			User ID to which this applies
  	<usage>			Structure refcount
  	<inst>/<keys>		Total number of keys and number instantiated
  	<keys>/<max>		Key count quota
  	<bytes>/<max>		Key size quota
  
  
  Four new sysctl files have been added also for the purpose of controlling the
  quota limits on keys:
  
   (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys
       /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes
  
       These files hold the maximum number of keys that root may have and the
       maximum total number of bytes of data that root may have stored in those
       keys.
  
   (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxkeys
       /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxbytes
  
       These files hold the maximum number of keys that each non-root user may
       have and the maximum total number of bytes of data that each of those
       users may have stored in their keys.
  
  Root may alter these by writing each new limit as a decimal number string to
  the appropriate file.
  
  
  ===============================
  USERSPACE SYSTEM CALL INTERFACE
  ===============================
  
  Userspace can manipulate keys directly through three new syscalls: add_key,
  request_key and keyctl. The latter provides a number of functions for
  manipulating keys.
  
  When referring to a key directly, userspace programs should use the key's
  serial number (a positive 32-bit integer). However, there are some special
  values available for referring to special keys and keyrings that relate to the
  process making the call:
  
  	CONSTANT			VALUE	KEY REFERENCED
  	==============================	======	===========================
  	KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING		-1	thread-specific keyring
  	KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING	-2	process-specific keyring
  	KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING	-3	session-specific keyring
  	KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING		-4	UID-specific keyring
  	KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING	-5	UID-session keyring
  	KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING		-6	GID-specific keyring
  	KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY	-7	assumed request_key()
  						  authorisation key
  
  
  The main syscalls are:
  
   (*) Create a new key of given type, description and payload and add it to the
       nominated keyring:
  
  	key_serial_t add_key(const char *type, const char *desc,
  			     const void *payload, size_t plen,
  			     key_serial_t keyring);
  
       If a key of the same type and description as that proposed already exists
       in the keyring, this will try to update it with the given payload, or it
       will return error EEXIST if that function is not supported by the key
       type. The process must also have permission to write to the key to be able
       to update it. The new key will have all user permissions granted and no
       group or third party permissions.
  
       Otherwise, this will attempt to create a new key of the specified type and
       description, and to instantiate it with the supplied payload and attach it
       to the keyring. In this case, an error will be generated if the process
       does not have permission to write to the keyring.
  
       If the key type supports it, if the description is NULL or an empty
       string, the key type will try and generate a description from the content
       of the payload.
  
       The payload is optional, and the pointer can be NULL if not required by
       the type. The payload is plen in size, and plen can be zero for an empty
       payload.
  
       A new keyring can be generated by setting type "keyring", the keyring name
       as the description (or NULL) and setting the payload to NULL.
  
       User defined keys can be created by specifying type "user". It is
       recommended that a user defined key's description by prefixed with a type
       ID and a colon, such as "krb5tgt:" for a Kerberos 5 ticket granting
       ticket.
  
       Any other type must have been registered with the kernel in advance by a
       kernel service such as a filesystem.
  
       The ID of the new or updated key is returned if successful.
  
  
   (*) Search the process's keyrings for a key, potentially calling out to
       userspace to create it.
  
  	key_serial_t request_key(const char *type, const char *description,
  				 const char *callout_info,
  				 key_serial_t dest_keyring);
  
       This function searches all the process's keyrings in the order thread,
       process, session for a matching key. This works very much like
       KEYCTL_SEARCH, including the optional attachment of the discovered key to
       a keyring.
  
       If a key cannot be found, and if callout_info is not NULL, then
       /sbin/request-key will be invoked in an attempt to obtain a key. The
       callout_info string will be passed as an argument to the program.
  
       See also Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt.
  
  
  The keyctl syscall functions are:
  
   (*) Map a special key ID to a real key ID for this process:
  
  	key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID, key_serial_t id,
  			    int create);
  
       The special key specified by "id" is looked up (with the key being created
       if necessary) and the ID of the key or keyring thus found is returned if
       it exists.
  
       If the key does not yet exist, the key will be created if "create" is
       non-zero; and the error ENOKEY will be returned if "create" is zero.
  
  
   (*) Replace the session keyring this process subscribes to with a new one:
  
  	key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, const char *name);
  
       If name is NULL, an anonymous keyring is created attached to the process
       as its session keyring, displacing the old session keyring.
  
       If name is not NULL, if a keyring of that name exists, the process
       attempts to attach it as the session keyring, returning an error if that
       is not permitted; otherwise a new keyring of that name is created and
       attached as the session keyring.
  
       To attach to a named keyring, the keyring must have search permission for
       the process's ownership.
  
       The ID of the new session keyring is returned if successful.
  
  
   (*) Update the specified key:
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_UPDATE, key_serial_t key, const void *payload,
  		    size_t plen);
  
       This will try to update the specified key with the given payload, or it
       will return error EOPNOTSUPP if that function is not supported by the key
       type. The process must also have permission to write to the key to be able
       to update it.
  
       The payload is of length plen, and may be absent or empty as for
       add_key().
  
  
   (*) Revoke a key:
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_REVOKE, key_serial_t key);
  
       This makes a key unavailable for further operations. Further attempts to
       use the key will be met with error EKEYREVOKED, and the key will no longer
       be findable.
  
  
   (*) Change the ownership of a key:
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_CHOWN, key_serial_t key, uid_t uid, gid_t gid);
  
       This function permits a key's owner and group ID to be changed. Either one
       of uid or gid can be set to -1 to suppress that change.
  
       Only the superuser can change a key's owner to something other than the
       key's current owner. Similarly, only the superuser can change a key's
       group ID to something other than the calling process's group ID or one of
       its group list members.
  
  
   (*) Change the permissions mask on a key:
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, key_serial_t key, key_perm_t perm);
  
       This function permits the owner of a key or the superuser to change the
       permissions mask on a key.
  
       Only bits the available bits are permitted; if any other bits are set,
       error EINVAL will be returned.
  
  
   (*) Describe a key:
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_DESCRIBE, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,
  		    size_t buflen);
  
       This function returns a summary of the key's attributes (but not its
       payload data) as a string in the buffer provided.
  
       Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could
       produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more
       than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy
       will take place.
  
       A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be
       successful.
  
       If successful, a string is placed in the buffer in the following format:
  
  	<type>;<uid>;<gid>;<perm>;<description>
  
       Where type and description are strings, uid and gid are decimal, and perm
       is hexadecimal. A NUL character is included at the end of the string if
       the buffer is sufficiently big.
  
       This can be parsed with
  
  	sscanf(buffer, "%[^;];%d;%d;%o;%s", type, &uid, &gid, &mode, desc);
  
  
   (*) Clear out a keyring:
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_CLEAR, key_serial_t keyring);
  
       This function clears the list of keys attached to a keyring. The calling
       process must have write permission on the keyring, and it must be a
       keyring (or else error ENOTDIR will result).
  
       This function can also be used to clear special kernel keyrings if they
       are appropriately marked if the user has CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability.  The
       DNS resolver cache keyring is an example of this.
  
  
   (*) Link a key into a keyring:
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK, key_serial_t keyring, key_serial_t key);
  
       This function creates a link from the keyring to the key. The process must
       have write permission on the keyring and must have link permission on the
       key.
  
       Should the keyring not be a keyring, error ENOTDIR will result; and if the
       keyring is full, error ENFILE will result.
  
       The link procedure checks the nesting of the keyrings, returning ELOOP if
       it appears too deep or EDEADLK if the link would introduce a cycle.
  
       Any links within the keyring to keys that match the new key in terms of
       type and description will be discarded from the keyring as the new one is
       added.
  
  
   (*) Unlink a key or keyring from another keyring:
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_UNLINK, key_serial_t keyring, key_serial_t key);
  
       This function looks through the keyring for the first link to the
       specified key, and removes it if found. Subsequent links to that key are
       ignored. The process must have write permission on the keyring.
  
       If the keyring is not a keyring, error ENOTDIR will result; and if the key
       is not present, error ENOENT will be the result.
  
  
   (*) Search a keyring tree for a key:
  
  	key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_SEARCH, key_serial_t keyring,
  			    const char *type, const char *description,
  			    key_serial_t dest_keyring);
  
       This searches the keyring tree headed by the specified keyring until a key
       is found that matches the type and description criteria. Each keyring is
       checked for keys before recursion into its children occurs.
  
       The process must have search permission on the top level keyring, or else
       error EACCES will result. Only keyrings that the process has search
       permission on will be recursed into, and only keys and keyrings for which
       a process has search permission can be matched. If the specified keyring
       is not a keyring, ENOTDIR will result.
  
       If the search succeeds, the function will attempt to link the found key
       into the destination keyring if one is supplied (non-zero ID). All the
       constraints applicable to KEYCTL_LINK apply in this case too.
  
       Error ENOKEY, EKEYREVOKED or EKEYEXPIRED will be returned if the search
       fails. On success, the resulting key ID will be returned.
  
  
   (*) Read the payload data from a key:
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_READ, key_serial_t keyring, char *buffer,
  		    size_t buflen);
  
       This function attempts to read the payload data from the specified key
       into the buffer. The process must have read permission on the key to
       succeed.
  
       The returned data will be processed for presentation by the key type. For
       instance, a keyring will return an array of key_serial_t entries
       representing the IDs of all the keys to which it is subscribed. The user
       defined key type will return its data as is. If a key type does not
       implement this function, error EOPNOTSUPP will result.
  
       As much of the data as can be fitted into the buffer will be copied to
       userspace if the buffer pointer is not NULL.
  
       On a successful return, the function will always return the amount of data
       available rather than the amount copied.
  
  
   (*) Instantiate a partially constructed key.
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, key_serial_t key,
  		    const void *payload, size_t plen,
  		    key_serial_t keyring);
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV, key_serial_t key,
  		    const struct iovec *payload_iov, unsigned ioc,
  		    key_serial_t keyring);
  
       If the kernel calls back to userspace to complete the instantiation of a
       key, userspace should use this call to supply data for the key before the
       invoked process returns, or else the key will be marked negative
       automatically.
  
       The process must have write access on the key to be able to instantiate
       it, and the key must be uninstantiated.
  
       If a keyring is specified (non-zero), the key will also be linked into
       that keyring, however all the constraints applying in KEYCTL_LINK apply in
       this case too.
  
       The payload and plen arguments describe the payload data as for add_key().
  
       The payload_iov and ioc arguments describe the payload data in an iovec
       array instead of a single buffer.
  
  
   (*) Negatively instantiate a partially constructed key.
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_NEGATE, key_serial_t key,
  		    unsigned timeout, key_serial_t keyring);
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_REJECT, key_serial_t key,
  		    unsigned timeout, unsigned error, key_serial_t keyring);
  
       If the kernel calls back to userspace to complete the instantiation of a
       key, userspace should use this call mark the key as negative before the
       invoked process returns if it is unable to fulfill the request.
  
       The process must have write access on the key to be able to instantiate
       it, and the key must be uninstantiated.
  
       If a keyring is specified (non-zero), the key will also be linked into
       that keyring, however all the constraints applying in KEYCTL_LINK apply in
       this case too.
  
       If the key is rejected, future searches for it will return the specified
       error code until the rejected key expires.  Negating the key is the same
       as rejecting the key with ENOKEY as the error code.
  
  
   (*) Set the default request-key destination keyring.
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING, int reqkey_defl);
  
       This sets the default keyring to which implicitly requested keys will be
       attached for this thread. reqkey_defl should be one of these constants:
  
  	CONSTANT				VALUE	NEW DEFAULT KEYRING
  	======================================	======	=======================
  	KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE		-1	No change
  	KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT			0	Default[1]
  	KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING		1	Thread keyring
  	KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING		2	Process keyring
  	KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING		3	Session keyring
  	KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING		4	User keyring
  	KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING	5	User session keyring
  	KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING		6	Group keyring
  
       The old default will be returned if successful and error EINVAL will be
       returned if reqkey_defl is not one of the above values.
  
       The default keyring can be overridden by the keyring indicated to the
       request_key() system call.
  
       Note that this setting is inherited across fork/exec.
  
       [1] The default is: the thread keyring if there is one, otherwise
       the process keyring if there is one, otherwise the session keyring if
       there is one, otherwise the user default session keyring.
  
  
   (*) Set the timeout on a key.
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT, key_serial_t key, unsigned timeout);
  
       This sets or clears the timeout on a key. The timeout can be 0 to clear
       the timeout or a number of seconds to set the expiry time that far into
       the future.
  
       The process must have attribute modification access on a key to set its
       timeout. Timeouts may not be set with this function on negative, revoked
       or expired keys.
  
  
   (*) Assume the authority granted to instantiate a key
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY, key_serial_t key);
  
       This assumes or divests the authority required to instantiate the
       specified key. Authority can only be assumed if the thread has the
       authorisation key associated with the specified key in its keyrings
       somewhere.
  
       Once authority is assumed, searches for keys will also search the
       requester's keyrings using the requester's security label, UID, GID and
       groups.
  
       If the requested authority is unavailable, error EPERM will be returned,
       likewise if the authority has been revoked because the target key is
       already instantiated.
  
       If the specified key is 0, then any assumed authority will be divested.
  
       The assumed authoritative key is inherited across fork and exec.
  
  
   (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key.
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,
  		    size_t buflen)
  
       This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context
       attached to a key in the buffer provided.
  
       Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could
       produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more
       than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy
       will take place.
  
       A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is
       sufficiently big.  This is included in the returned count.  If no LSM is
       in force then an empty string will be returned.
  
       A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be
       successful.
  
  
   (*) Install the calling process's session keyring on its parent.
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
  
       This functions attempts to install the calling process's session keyring
       on to the calling process's parent, replacing the parent's current session
       keyring.
  
       The calling process must have the same ownership as its parent, the
       keyring must have the same ownership as the calling process, the calling
       process must have LINK permission on the keyring and the active LSM module
       mustn't deny permission, otherwise error EPERM will be returned.
  
       Error ENOMEM will be returned if there was insufficient memory to complete
       the operation, otherwise 0 will be returned to indicate success.
  
       The keyring will be replaced next time the parent process leaves the
       kernel and resumes executing userspace.
  
  
   (*) Invalidate a key.
  
  	long keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key_serial_t key);
  
       This function marks a key as being invalidated and then wakes up the
       garbage collector.  The garbage collector immediately removes invalidated
       keys from all keyrings and deletes the key when its reference count
       reaches zero.
  
       Keys that are marked invalidated become invisible to normal key operations
       immediately, though they are still visible in /proc/keys until deleted
       (they're marked with an 'i' flag).
  
       A process must have search permission on the key for this function to be
       successful.
  
  
  ===============
  KERNEL SERVICES
  ===============
  
  The kernel services for key management are fairly simple to deal with. They can
  be broken down into two areas: keys and key types.
  
  Dealing with keys is fairly straightforward. Firstly, the kernel service
  registers its type, then it searches for a key of that type. It should retain
  the key as long as it has need of it, and then it should release it. For a
  filesystem or device file, a search would probably be performed during the open
  call, and the key released upon close. How to deal with conflicting keys due to
  two different users opening the same file is left to the filesystem author to
  solve.
  
  To access the key manager, the following header must be #included:
  
  	<linux/key.h>
  
  Specific key types should have a header file under include/keys/ that should be
  used to access that type.  For keys of type "user", for example, that would be:
  
  	<keys/user-type.h>
  
  Note that there are two different types of pointers to keys that may be
  encountered:
  
   (*) struct key *
  
       This simply points to the key structure itself. Key structures will be at
       least four-byte aligned.
  
   (*) key_ref_t
  
       This is equivalent to a struct key *, but the least significant bit is set
       if the caller "possesses" the key. By "possession" it is meant that the
       calling processes has a searchable link to the key from one of its
       keyrings. There are three functions for dealing with these:
  
  	key_ref_t make_key_ref(const struct key *key, bool possession);
  
  	struct key *key_ref_to_ptr(const key_ref_t key_ref);
  
  	bool is_key_possessed(const key_ref_t key_ref);
  
       The first function constructs a key reference from a key pointer and
       possession information (which must be true or false).
  
       The second function retrieves the key pointer from a reference and the
       third retrieves the possession flag.
  
  When accessing a key's payload contents, certain precautions must be taken to
  prevent access vs modification races. See the section "Notes on accessing
  payload contents" for more information.
  
  (*) To search for a key, call:
  
  	struct key *request_key(const struct key_type *type,
  				const char *description,
  				const char *callout_info);
  
      This is used to request a key or keyring with a description that matches
      the description specified according to the key type's match function. This
      permits approximate matching to occur. If callout_string is not NULL, then
      /sbin/request-key will be invoked in an attempt to obtain the key from
      userspace. In that case, callout_string will be passed as an argument to
      the program.
  
      Should the function fail error ENOKEY, EKEYEXPIRED or EKEYREVOKED will be
      returned.
  
      If successful, the key will have been attached to the default keyring for
      implicitly obtained request-key keys, as set by KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING.
  
      See also Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt.
  
  
  (*) To search for a key, passing auxiliary data to the upcaller, call:
  
  	struct key *request_key_with_auxdata(const struct key_type *type,
  					     const char *description,
  					     const void *callout_info,
  					     size_t callout_len,
  					     void *aux);
  
      This is identical to request_key(), except that the auxiliary data is
      passed to the key_type->request_key() op if it exists, and the callout_info
      is a blob of length callout_len, if given (the length may be 0).
  
  
  (*) A key can be requested asynchronously by calling one of:
  
  	struct key *request_key_async(const struct key_type *type,
  				      const char *description,
  				      const void *callout_info,
  				      size_t callout_len);
  
      or:
  
  	struct key *request_key_async_with_auxdata(const struct key_type *type,
  						   const char *description,
  						   const char *callout_info,
  					     	   size_t callout_len,
  					     	   void *aux);
  
      which are asynchronous equivalents of request_key() and
      request_key_with_auxdata() respectively.
  
      These two functions return with the key potentially still under
      construction.  To wait for construction completion, the following should be
      called:
  
  	int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr);
  
      The function will wait for the key to finish being constructed and then
      invokes key_validate() to return an appropriate value to indicate the state
      of the key (0 indicates the key is usable).
  
      If intr is true, then the wait can be interrupted by a signal, in which
      case error ERESTARTSYS will be returned.
  
  
  (*) When it is no longer required, the key should be released using:
  
  	void key_put(struct key *key);
  
      Or:
  
  	void key_ref_put(key_ref_t key_ref);
  
      These can be called from interrupt context. If CONFIG_KEYS is not set then
      the argument will not be parsed.
  
  
  (*) Extra references can be made to a key by calling one of the following
      functions:
  
  	struct key *__key_get(struct key *key);
  	struct key *key_get(struct key *key);
  
      Keys so references will need to be disposed of by calling key_put() when
      they've been finished with.  The key pointer passed in will be returned.
  
      In the case of key_get(), if the pointer is NULL or CONFIG_KEYS is not set
      then the key will not be dereferenced and no increment will take place.
  
  
  (*) A key's serial number can be obtained by calling:
  
  	key_serial_t key_serial(struct key *key);
  
      If key is NULL or if CONFIG_KEYS is not set then 0 will be returned (in the
      latter case without parsing the argument).
  
  
  (*) If a keyring was found in the search, this can be further searched by:
  
  	key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
  				 const struct key_type *type,
  				 const char *description)
  
      This searches the keyring tree specified for a matching key. Error ENOKEY
      is returned upon failure (use IS_ERR/PTR_ERR to determine). If successful,
      the returned key will need to be released.
  
      The possession attribute from the keyring reference is used to control
      access through the permissions mask and is propagated to the returned key
      reference pointer if successful.
  
  
  (*) A keyring can be created by:
  
  	struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
  				  const struct cred *cred,
  				  key_perm_t perm,
  				  unsigned long flags,
  				  struct key *dest);
  
      This creates a keyring with the given attributes and returns it.  If dest
      is not NULL, the new keyring will be linked into the keyring to which it
      points.  No permission checks are made upon the destination keyring.
  
      Error EDQUOT can be returned if the keyring would overload the quota (pass
      KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA in flags if the keyring shouldn't be accounted
      towards the user's quota).  Error ENOMEM can also be returned.
  
  
  (*) To check the validity of a key, this function can be called:
  
  	int validate_key(struct key *key);
  
      This checks that the key in question hasn't expired or and hasn't been
      revoked. Should the key be invalid, error EKEYEXPIRED or EKEYREVOKED will
      be returned. If the key is NULL or if CONFIG_KEYS is not set then 0 will be
      returned (in the latter case without parsing the argument).
  
  
  (*) To register a key type, the following function should be called:
  
  	int register_key_type(struct key_type *type);
  
      This will return error EEXIST if a type of the same name is already
      present.
  
  
  (*) To unregister a key type, call:
  
  	void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *type);
  
  
  Under some circumstances, it may be desirable to deal with a bundle of keys.
  The facility provides access to the keyring type for managing such a bundle:
  
  	struct key_type key_type_keyring;
  
  This can be used with a function such as request_key() to find a specific
  keyring in a process's keyrings.  A keyring thus found can then be searched
  with keyring_search().  Note that it is not possible to use request_key() to
  search a specific keyring, so using keyrings in this way is of limited utility.
  
  
  ===================================
  NOTES ON ACCESSING PAYLOAD CONTENTS
  ===================================
  
  The simplest payload is just a number in key->payload.value. In this case,
  there's no need to indulge in RCU or locking when accessing the payload.
  
  More complex payload contents must be allocated and a pointer to them set in
  key->payload.data. One of the following ways must be selected to access the
  data:
  
   (1) Unmodifiable key type.
  
       If the key type does not have a modify method, then the key's payload can
       be accessed without any form of locking, provided that it's known to be
       instantiated (uninstantiated keys cannot be "found").
  
   (2) The key's semaphore.
  
       The semaphore could be used to govern access to the payload and to control
       the payload pointer. It must be write-locked for modifications and would
       have to be read-locked for general access. The disadvantage of doing this
       is that the accessor may be required to sleep.
  
   (3) RCU.
  
       RCU must be used when the semaphore isn't already held; if the semaphore
       is held then the contents can't change under you unexpectedly as the
       semaphore must still be used to serialise modifications to the key. The
       key management code takes care of this for the key type.
  
       However, this means using:
  
  	rcu_read_lock() ... rcu_dereference() ... rcu_read_unlock()
  
       to read the pointer, and:
  
  	rcu_dereference() ... rcu_assign_pointer() ... call_rcu()
  
       to set the pointer and dispose of the old contents after a grace period.
       Note that only the key type should ever modify a key's payload.
  
       Furthermore, an RCU controlled payload must hold a struct rcu_head for the
       use of call_rcu() and, if the payload is of variable size, the length of
       the payload. key->datalen cannot be relied upon to be consistent with the
       payload just dereferenced if the key's semaphore is not held.
  
  
  ===================
  DEFINING A KEY TYPE
  ===================
  
  A kernel service may want to define its own key type. For instance, an AFS
  filesystem might want to define a Kerberos 5 ticket key type. To do this, it
  author fills in a key_type struct and registers it with the system.
  
  Source files that implement key types should include the following header file:
  
  	<linux/key-type.h>
  
  The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory:
  
   (*) const char *name
  
       The name of the key type. This is used to translate a key type name
       supplied by userspace into a pointer to the structure.
  
  
   (*) size_t def_datalen
  
       This is optional - it supplies the default payload data length as
       contributed to the quota. If the key type's payload is always or almost
       always the same size, then this is a more efficient way to do things.
  
       The data length (and quota) on a particular key can always be changed
       during instantiation or update by calling:
  
  	int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen);
  
       With the revised data length. Error EDQUOT will be returned if this is not
       viable.
  
  
   (*) int (*vet_description)(const char *description);
  
       This optional method is called to vet a key description.  If the key type
       doesn't approve of the key description, it may return an error, otherwise
       it should return 0.
  
  
   (*) int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
  
       This optional method permits the key type to attempt to parse payload
       before a key is created (add key) or the key semaphore is taken (update or
       instantiate key).  The structure pointed to by prep looks like:
  
  	struct key_preparsed_payload {
  		char		*description;
  		void		*type_data[2];
  		void		*payload;
  		const void	*data;
  		size_t		datalen;
  		size_t		quotalen;
  	};
  
       Before calling the method, the caller will fill in data and datalen with
       the payload blob parameters; quotalen will be filled in with the default
       quota size from the key type and the rest will be cleared.
  
       If a description can be proposed from the payload contents, that should be
       attached as a string to the description field.  This will be used for the
       key description if the caller of add_key() passes NULL or "".
  
       The method can attach anything it likes to type_data[] and payload.  These
       are merely passed along to the instantiate() or update() operations.
  
       The method should return 0 if success ful or a negative error code
       otherwise.
  
       
   (*) void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
  
       This method is only required if the preparse() method is provided,
       otherwise it is unused.  It cleans up anything attached to the
       description, type_data and payload fields of the key_preparsed_payload
       struct as filled in by the preparse() method.
  
  
   (*) int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
  
       This method is called to attach a payload to a key during construction.
       The payload attached need not bear any relation to the data passed to this
       function.
  
       The prep->data and prep->datalen fields will define the original payload
       blob.  If preparse() was supplied then other fields may be filled in also.
  
       If the amount of data attached to the key differs from the size in
       keytype->def_datalen, then key_payload_reserve() should be called.
  
       This method does not have to lock the key in order to attach a payload.
       The fact that KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED is not set in key->flags prevents
       anything else from gaining access to the key.
  
       It is safe to sleep in this method.
  
  
   (*) int (*update)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen);
  
       If this type of key can be updated, then this method should be provided.
       It is called to update a key's payload from the blob of data provided.
  
       The prep->data and prep->datalen fields will define the original payload
       blob.  If preparse() was supplied then other fields may be filled in also.
  
       key_payload_reserve() should be called if the data length might change
       before any changes are actually made. Note that if this succeeds, the type
       is committed to changing the key because it's already been altered, so all
       memory allocation must be done first.
  
       The key will have its semaphore write-locked before this method is called,
       but this only deters other writers; any changes to the key's payload must
       be made under RCU conditions, and call_rcu() must be used to dispose of
       the old payload.
  
       key_payload_reserve() should be called before the changes are made, but
       after all allocations and other potentially failing function calls are
       made.
  
       It is safe to sleep in this method.
  
  
   (*) int (*match)(const struct key *key, const void *desc);
  
       This method is called to match a key against a description. It should
       return non-zero if the two match, zero if they don't.
  
       This method should not need to lock the key in any way. The type and
       description can be considered invariant, and the payload should not be
       accessed (the key may not yet be instantiated).
  
       It is not safe to sleep in this method; the caller may hold spinlocks.
  
  
   (*) void (*revoke)(struct key *key);
  
       This method is optional.  It is called to discard part of the payload
       data upon a key being revoked.  The caller will have the key semaphore
       write-locked.
  
       It is safe to sleep in this method, though care should be taken to avoid
       a deadlock against the key semaphore.
  
  
   (*) void (*destroy)(struct key *key);
  
       This method is optional. It is called to discard the payload data on a key
       when it is being destroyed.
  
       This method does not need to lock the key to access the payload; it can
       consider the key as being inaccessible at this time. Note that the key's
       type may have been changed before this function is called.
  
       It is not safe to sleep in this method; the caller may hold spinlocks.
  
  
   (*) void (*describe)(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *p);
  
       This method is optional. It is called during /proc/keys reading to
       summarise a key's description and payload in text form.
  
       This method will be called with the RCU read lock held. rcu_dereference()
       should be used to read the payload pointer if the payload is to be
       accessed. key->datalen cannot be trusted to stay consistent with the
       contents of the payload.
  
       The description will not change, though the key's state may.
  
       It is not safe to sleep in this method; the RCU read lock is held by the
       caller.
  
  
   (*) long (*read)(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen);
  
       This method is optional. It is called by KEYCTL_READ to translate the
       key's payload into something a blob of data for userspace to deal with.
       Ideally, the blob should be in the same format as that passed in to the
       instantiate and update methods.
  
       If successful, the blob size that could be produced should be returned
       rather than the size copied.
  
       This method will be called with the key's semaphore read-locked. This will
       prevent the key's payload changing. It is not necessary to use RCU locking
       when accessing the key's payload. It is safe to sleep in this method, such
       as might happen when the userspace buffer is accessed.
  
  
   (*) int (*request_key)(struct key_construction *cons, const char *op,
  			void *aux);
  
       This method is optional.  If provided, request_key() and friends will
       invoke this function rather than upcalling to /sbin/request-key to operate
       upon a key of this type.
  
       The aux parameter is as passed to request_key_async_with_auxdata() and
       similar or is NULL otherwise.  Also passed are the construction record for
       the key to be operated upon and the operation type (currently only
       "create").
  
       This method is permitted to return before the upcall is complete, but the
       following function must be called under all circumstances to complete the
       instantiation process, whether or not it succeeds, whether or not there's
       an error:
  
  	void complete_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, int error);
  
       The error parameter should be 0 on success, -ve on error.  The
       construction record is destroyed by this action and the authorisation key
       will be revoked.  If an error is indicated, the key under construction
       will be negatively instantiated if it wasn't already instantiated.
  
       If this method returns an error, that error will be returned to the
       caller of request_key*().  complete_request_key() must be called prior to
       returning.
  
       The key under construction and the authorisation key can be found in the
       key_construction struct pointed to by cons:
  
       (*) struct key *key;
  
       	 The key under construction.
  
       (*) struct key *authkey;
  
       	 The authorisation key.
  
  
  ============================
  REQUEST-KEY CALLBACK SERVICE
  ============================
  
  To create a new key, the kernel will attempt to execute the following command
  line:
  
  	/sbin/request-key create <key> <uid> <gid> \
  		<threadring> <processring> <sessionring> <callout_info>
  
  <key> is the key being constructed, and the three keyrings are the process
  keyrings from the process that caused the search to be issued. These are
  included for two reasons:
  
    (1) There may be an authentication token in one of the keyrings that is
        required to obtain the key, eg: a Kerberos Ticket-Granting Ticket.
  
    (2) The new key should probably be cached in one of these rings.
  
  This program should set it UID and GID to those specified before attempting to
  access any more keys. It may then look around for a user specific process to
  hand the request off to (perhaps a path held in placed in another key by, for
  example, the KDE desktop manager).
  
  The program (or whatever it calls) should finish construction of the key by
  calling KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV, which also permits it to
  cache the key in one of the keyrings (probably the session ring) before
  returning.  Alternatively, the key can be marked as negative with KEYCTL_NEGATE
  or KEYCTL_REJECT; this also permits the key to be cached in one of the
  keyrings.
  
  If it returns with the key remaining in the unconstructed state, the key will
  be marked as being negative, it will be added to the session keyring, and an
  error will be returned to the key requestor.
  
  Supplementary information may be provided from whoever or whatever invoked this
  service. This will be passed as the <callout_info> parameter. If no such
  information was made available, then "-" will be passed as this parameter
  instead.
  
  
  Similarly, the kernel may attempt to update an expired or a soon to expire key
  by executing:
  
  	/sbin/request-key update <key> <uid> <gid> \
  		<threadring> <processring> <sessionring>
  
  In this case, the program isn't required to actually attach the key to a ring;
  the rings are provided for reference.
  
  
  ==================
  GARBAGE COLLECTION
  ==================
  
  Dead keys (for which the type has been removed) will be automatically unlinked
  from those keyrings that point to them and deleted as soon as possible by a
  background garbage collector.
  
  Similarly, revoked and expired keys will be garbage collected, but only after a
  certain amount of time has passed.  This time is set as a number of seconds in:
  
  	/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay